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MARKSMANSHIP HISTORY: THE MALAY EMERGENCY

Started by Cav1, May 10, 2008, 10:01:01 AM

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Cav1

Great Britain provided one of the few truly successful examples of a Western power defeating a Communist insurgency in Malaysia from 1948 to 1960. It was officially called an Emergency rather than a War, by the way, because if it was a real-live war then Lloyd's of London would not insure the damages incurred.

Winston Churchill himself appointed Sir Gerald Walter Templer as High Commissioner and Director of Operations. He was the right man for the job. Much of his policy revolved around the so-called Briggs Plan, resettlements of suspect villages, and the winning of hearts and minds. But as military commander, he didn't like much of what he saw. Time magazine quoted him in 1954 as saying, "We've got some bloody bad soldiers in Malaya!"

He set about correcting that. Much to the horror of the "Colonel Blimp" types, he even banned playing golf on weekdays and allowed the locals to use the formerly "rich whites only" clubs. Despite the availability of support from the Royal Navy and Air Force, helicopters and artillery, Templer knew the issue would be settled in the jungles and in the jungles only men with rifles counted.

Rather than "swatting flies with a sledgehammer" as the American high command is wont to do, the British sent out small, stealthy patrols of infantrymen into the heart of the guerilla strongholds. Arriving in country, they were put through rigorous jungle training before being sent out on patrol. Much of that training centered around marksmanship.


Templer had four main priorities for winning the war in the jungles. Number Two on the list was: "The vital importance of accurate and quick shooting, particularly with single shot weapons (bolt actions). If only we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya."

The ATOM Manual (Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya) was like the Ranger Handbook for the British, Gurkha, and ANZAC troops fighting in Malaya. Over and over it stressed marksmanship.
"A rapid rate of fire will increase the chances of a kill. However, it is important that a proper aim from the shoulder, using the sights, should always be taken."

"To perfect the soldier for jungle shooting it is necessary to practice him in the standing, kneeling, sitting and lying positions. He must be brought up to a standard where he can shoot accurately at the most fleeting targets from awkward positions."

"The constant need for shooting practice cannot be overemphasized. It should be carried out at every available opportunity, on whatever form of range happens to be available."

"The standard of shooting required for success in Malaya can never be set too high. This standard can be achieved only by careful, continuous training."

Special ranges were set up to train the infantry; the Malayan Range, the Jungle Lane, and the Ambush Range. Many targets were stationary and half-concealed in the brush or behind trees; others were "movers". In the Ambush Range the targets moved at a walking pace until the first shot was fire, then "broke into a run". Although their armories included the famous Bren light machine gun and the British Sterling and Australian Owen submachine guns, the majority of the work, as always, was done with the rifle. In the beginning it was usually the Lee-Enfield No. 5 Jungle Carbine in .303 and in the end the SLR, Self-Loading Rifle, the British L1A1 version of the FN-FAL in .308 caliber.

Thorough training, good rifles, and small, furtive patrols all combined to make life a living hell for the enemy CT's, or Communist Terrorists. Where large, cumbersome military operations involving battalions and up were easily given away and then avoided, the CT's never knew the small patrols were operating in their area until the first shots rang out and they started going down.

Constantly harried and on the defensive against aggressive British  patrols in the furthest corners of the jungle, and unable to obtain supplies or support from the cities and villages, the Communists soon found the tables turning against them. When they tried to raise their own food in jungle clearings, the Royal Air Force strafed, bombed, and sprayed them. Pushed further and further back into the dismal, brutal jungles, disease took an increasing toll.

In August 1957, Malaya was granted independence, taking away the last of the Communists' supposed rationale for the conflict. The last resisting Communist guerilla forces surrendered in 1958 or fled to Thailand. In 1960 Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Rahman officially declared "The Emergency" to be over.

"One hundred misses per minute is not firepower. One hit per minute is." The Guru, Jeff Cooper

socalserf

I read an account of the fighting a while back.
I remember an ex-communist saying that the British patrols would walk into ambushes and the Comm. would be afraid to
spring them because the return fire was too lethal!
I would guess that the commies were not effective in there weapon use!
"we cannot improve what we do not measure."


Will

The British as I understand it also made extensive use of the combat shotgun in Malaya as well. The Auto 5 being a favorite.

Cav1

Pump shotguns were issued 50 per Commonwealth infantry batallion, according to TO&E. Brit parlance in the ATOM manual lists them as "Magazine Shotgun (Pumpguns)". The SAS and other elite units made good use of the Auto-5.

Read it somewhere a long time ago and now can't remember the source. Said they liked to mix loads of double 00 buckshot and #2 birdshot. If the buck didn't get you, the birdshot kept you a bit distratced from your weapons handling for the moment until the second shot arrived.
"One hundred misses per minute is not firepower. One hit per minute is." The Guru, Jeff Cooper