https://allthingsliberty.com/2019/11/lexington-and-concord-a-case-study-in-leadership-and-direct-action/
THAT is a pretty fascinating perspective. Thank you, Beast!
Thank you!
The discussion of leadership brings up something I don't recall seeing called out anywhere--I post here wondering if anyone else could give me a steer (or correct me so I don't keep going down the wrong rabbit hole!)
It appears that from Col. Smith's perspective as he headed from Lexington to Concord, his majors had, at best, underperformed that morning. Major Mitchell had released Paul Revere and abandoned his position on the Concord road, and the Lexington fight had been on Major Pitcairn's watch.
Reaching Concord, he made different choices. He had two companies of his own regiment with him, and managed to put the officers and men of the 10th in all four places his column posted up:
--Smith himself remained in Concord with the main body of his force (and then personally led the relief toward North Bridge).
--The magnificently named Captain Mundy Pole and the grenadier company of the 10th led the South Bridge guard detachment.
--Captain Lawrence Parsons, the 10th's light infantry company commander, crossed at North Bridge and led the expedition to Barrett's farm.
--The 10th's light infantry company, without Captain Parsons, remained with the guard force at North Bridge.
It feels like after Lexington, Smith made a deliberate effort to have men of his regiment, who he knew personally, everywhere, rather than trusting his majors again with detachments on important missions. Perhaps a sign of how Smith was recognizing and struggling with the peculiar leadership situation of his column even as he arrived in Concord?
Thanks Robert,
I echo Mrs. Smith's observation. A comprehensive and detailed examination. I found a good deal of new quotations and information to me.
As a retired officer who has taught operations, a couple of significant failures come to mind.
Unity of Command - it is the principle that there is but one commander. Given the secrecy in the selection of soldiers, and the strange command structure, new leadership, I think this is the foremost failure of the expedition. But there is a second critical lacking.
Second is to make sure the commander's intent and objective are passed down to the lowest level of command in a form they may need to effectively execute the operation. The secrecy may have been maintained by limiting the objective and concept of operation to the officer staff in Boston. The order should have been passed both in person and in writing. It was not. None of the officers had any idea of the final objective (Fisher addresses this in his book following the engagement at Lexington Green.) Secondly, after the forces were deployed, the operations order could have been briefed down to all. That is the way it is done now. This could have been easily accomplished at the disembarkation point in Cambridge when the force was simply standing about on the road awaiting Navy rations and the order to march.
Commander's Intent. When I began this business back in 69, the Concept of Operation lacked a "Commander's Intent" . That was rectified in in the 80s. It is the first item in the Concept of Operations paragraph of the Order, and gives a perspective for *all* that follows and a unified focus for all engaged in the operation. This was clearly missing in the discursive letter of Gage (i.e., his Operations Order) to Smith. Here is a summary of the Commander's Intent paragraph..... "As described in ADRP 5-0, the commander's intent "succinctly describes what constitutes success for the operation. It includes the operation's purpose, key tasks, and the conditions that define the end state. It links the mission, concept of operations, and tasks to subordinate units. A clear commander's intent facilitates a shared understanding and focuses on the overall conditions that represent mission accomplishment." Commander's intent, when used properly, should bridge the gap between the mission and the concept of operations. A clear commander's intent enables a shared understanding and focuses on the overall conditions that represent mission accomplishment.
I suspect General William Heath did not make the same mistake as Gage, and that the militia commanders were fully aware of his intent in the moving ring of fire as the Redcoats retreated (although at least one seems to have ignored the intent (Pickering))
It is interesting how Southwest Airline employed this "Intent" to focus every member's attention on the prime objective.
https://www.samuelthomasdavies.com/commanders-intent/
We have learned a great deal in our American military experience on command and control-often from mistakes like Gage's.
msc
Good article. Thanks for sharing.
Thanks for finding this!